* Record that Bot Fight Mode is off Both docs still claimed Bot Fight Mode was enabled. It is off; the Caddy origin allowlist stays in force. Neither CI nor the on-box probe can get past it on the free plan, so re-enabling needs the changes tracked in #153. * Note that the probe must be installed to two places The timer runs /usr/local/sbin/chesstrainer-probe, not the copy under /opt/chesstrainer/src. Say so next to the install block, as the backup section already does, so a changed deploy/probe does not silently drift from what the timer runs.
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Login and edge security
The login surface is protected in layers. The application throttle is the primary control; Cloudflare is the edge backstop for volume. There is no origin-level fail2ban for HTTP logins, because it would require storing raw IP addresses and would ban Cloudflare edge addresses on this deployment.
Current production configuration
- Caddy accepts only Cloudflare's published ranges and forwards
CF-Connecting-IPasX-Forwarded-For. The ranges are refreshed hourly bychesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.timer. TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR=true, so the app throttles by the real visitor address.- Cloudflare Bot Fight Mode is off. The Caddy origin allowlist above stays in force; re-enabling is tracked in #153.
- The free-plan login flood rule allows 10 login POSTs per 10 seconds per IP and blocks for 10 seconds.
The short Cloudflare block is rate smoothing, not a credential lockout. The application's 5-per-login and 10-per-address failures in a 15-minute window are the real control.
1. Application login throttle
ChesstrainerWeb.LoginThrottle counts failures in two buckets:
| Bucket | Limit | Window |
|---|---|---|
| Normalised login (email or username) | 5 failures | 15 minutes |
| Client address | 10 failures | 15 minutes |
Blocked attempts are rejected before the database lookup and bcrypt, so they do not consume password-hashing CPU. A successful login clears the login bucket only, keeping the address bucket in place so one address cannot spray many accounts.
The bucket keys are boot-scoped HMACs. Raw addresses and raw login identifiers are never stored in ETS or written to the application logs. The login form returns the same generic error for unknown accounts, bad passwords and unconfirmed accounts.
Configured in config/config.exs:
config :chesstrainer, ChesstrainerWeb.LoginThrottle,
window_ms: :timer.minutes(15),
max_per_login: 5,
max_per_ip: 10,
confirmation_cooldown_ms: :timer.minutes(15)
auth.login.failed and auth.login.throttled are documented in
docs/logging.md.
2. Real client IPs behind Cloudflare and Caddy
The production chain is:
Internet
└─ Cloudflare
└─ Caddy :443
└─ Phoenix 127.0.0.1:4100
Caddy ignores incoming X-Forwarded-* values by default and replaces them with
the immediate peer address. Behind Cloudflare that peer is a Cloudflare edge
node, so without configuration the app would throttle whole Cloudflare POPs
rather than individual visitors.
deploy/Caddyfile fixes this by:
- accepting only Cloudflare's published ranges, and
- setting
X-Forwarded-Forfrom Cloudflare's single-valueCF-Connecting-IPheader.
That keeps TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR=true safe: direct clients cannot reach the app
through Caddy, so they cannot forge the header.
deploy/Caddyfile imports cloudflare-ranges.caddy. The file is generated by
deploy/update-cloudflare-ranges.sh; do not edit it by hand.
The script is run hourly by chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.timer. It:
- downloads https://www.cloudflare.com/ips-v4 and https://www.cloudflare.com/ips-v6,
- rejects empty or malformed responses,
- validates the candidate Caddyfile,
- reloads Caddy only when the ranges changed.
If the download, validation or Caddy reload fails, the previous ranges stay in place.
Install and run it:
sudo install -m 0755 /opt/chesstrainer/src/deploy/update-cloudflare-ranges.sh \
/usr/local/sbin/chesstrainer-update-cloudflare-ranges
sudo install -m 0644 /opt/chesstrainer/src/deploy/cloudflare-ranges.caddy \
/etc/caddy/cloudflare-ranges.caddy
sudo install -m 0644 /opt/chesstrainer/src/deploy/chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.service \
/etc/systemd/system/chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.service
sudo install -m 0644 /opt/chesstrainer/src/deploy/chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.timer \
/etc/systemd/system/chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.timer
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
sudo systemctl enable --now chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.timer
sudo systemctl start chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.service
If /opt/chesstrainer/src/deploy is not present on the VPS, create the same
four files directly with sudo tee from the canonical contents in deploy/.
The timer only uses the installed copies.
Check the timer and last run:
systemctl list-timers chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.timer
systemctl status chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.service
journalctl -u chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.service --since "24 hours ago"
Apply the site block by hand on the shared Caddy host, then validate and reload:
sudo caddy validate --config /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
sudo systemctl reload caddy
Direct requests to the origin with a spoofed CF-Connecting-IP must receive
403 Access Denied; only Cloudflare's ranges should reach the Phoenix app. A
host firewall allowlist for Cloudflare on ports 80 and 443 is a useful
defence-in-depth addition.
3. Cloudflare edge rate limiting
This is for connection and request floods, not credential guessing. The application already stops password attempts cheaply.
The production rule is the free-plan version:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Name | Login POST flood |
| Expression | (http.request.method eq "POST" and http.request.uri.path in {"/admin/log-in" "/users/log-in"}) |
| Characteristic | IP |
| Period | 10 seconds |
| Requests | 10 |
| Action | Block |
| Duration | 10 seconds |
Because the free plan only offers a 10-second period and a 10-second block, this is a burst limiter rather than a lasting ban. An attacker can retry after ten seconds, but the application still stops that login after five failures and that address after ten failures within fifteen minutes. A slow attacker staying under 10 requests per 10 seconds never gets to make useful guesses because of the app throttle.
Bot Fight Mode is off. On the free plan it cannot be skipped for CI or for the
on-box health probe, so a datacenter curl gets a 403 while the site itself is
healthy; #153 covers the gate and probe changes needed before it goes back on.
If the plan later gains longer rate-limit windows or managed WAF rules, raise
the block duration and consider a broader site-wide rule, such as 100 requests
per 10 seconds per IP with a managed challenge. Use Under Attack Mode during an
active incident.
Registration cannot be limited this way
/users/register is a LiveView. The form submit is a LiveView event sent over
the shared /live/websocket connection, not a POST /users/register request.
Cloudflare therefore cannot count account creations with a rule on the
registration path.
A Cloudflare rule on GET /users/register only limits page opens; a bot can
open one page and submit many registrations over the socket. If registration
spam becomes a problem, add an application-level registration throttle keyed by
ChesstrainerWeb.ClientAddress.from_socket/1, and/or add Cloudflare Turnstile
to the form.
While PRELAUNCH=true, registration is blocked entirely by the prelaunch plug
and LiveView mount redirect.
4. Why not fail2ban for HTTP?
fail2ban needs the raw client address to build a firewall rule. The application deliberately logs only a boot-scoped HMAC, and this deployment sits behind Cloudflare. Banning the address that reaches the origin would ban Cloudflare edges, not attackers.
fail2ban remains useful for services that terminate connections directly on the VPS, such as SSH. It is not part of the HTTP login defence.