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* Record that Bot Fight Mode is off Both docs still claimed Bot Fight Mode was enabled. It is off; the Caddy origin allowlist stays in force. Neither CI nor the on-box probe can get past it on the free plan, so re-enabling needs the changes tracked in #153. * Note that the probe must be installed to two places The timer runs /usr/local/sbin/chesstrainer-probe, not the copy under /opt/chesstrainer/src. Say so next to the install block, as the backup section already does, so a changed deploy/probe does not silently drift from what the timer runs.
192 lines
7.3 KiB
Markdown
192 lines
7.3 KiB
Markdown
# Login and edge security
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The login surface is protected in layers. The application throttle is the
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primary control; Cloudflare is the edge backstop for volume. There is no
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origin-level fail2ban for HTTP logins, because it would require storing raw IP
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addresses and would ban Cloudflare edge addresses on this deployment.
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## Current production configuration
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- Caddy accepts only Cloudflare's published ranges and forwards
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`CF-Connecting-IP` as `X-Forwarded-For`. The ranges are refreshed hourly by
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`chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.timer`.
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- `TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR=true`, so the app throttles by the real visitor address.
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- Cloudflare Bot Fight Mode is off. The Caddy origin allowlist above stays in
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force; re-enabling is tracked in #153.
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- The free-plan login flood rule allows 10 login POSTs per 10 seconds per IP and
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blocks for 10 seconds.
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The short Cloudflare block is rate smoothing, not a credential lockout. The
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application's 5-per-login and 10-per-address failures in a 15-minute window are
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the real control.
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## 1. Application login throttle
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`ChesstrainerWeb.LoginThrottle` counts failures in two buckets:
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| Bucket | Limit | Window |
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|---|---|---|
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| Normalised login (email or username) | 5 failures | 15 minutes |
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| Client address | 10 failures | 15 minutes |
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Blocked attempts are rejected before the database lookup and bcrypt, so they do
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not consume password-hashing CPU. A successful login clears the login bucket
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only, keeping the address bucket in place so one address cannot spray many
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accounts.
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The bucket keys are boot-scoped HMACs. Raw addresses and raw login identifiers
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are never stored in ETS or written to the application logs. The login form
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returns the same generic error for unknown accounts, bad passwords and
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unconfirmed accounts.
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Configured in `config/config.exs`:
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```elixir
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config :chesstrainer, ChesstrainerWeb.LoginThrottle,
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window_ms: :timer.minutes(15),
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max_per_login: 5,
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max_per_ip: 10,
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confirmation_cooldown_ms: :timer.minutes(15)
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```
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`auth.login.failed` and `auth.login.throttled` are documented in
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`docs/logging.md`.
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## 2. Real client IPs behind Cloudflare and Caddy
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The production chain is:
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```text
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Internet
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└─ Cloudflare
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└─ Caddy :443
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└─ Phoenix 127.0.0.1:4100
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```
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Caddy ignores incoming `X-Forwarded-*` values by default and replaces them with
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the immediate peer address. Behind Cloudflare that peer is a Cloudflare edge
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node, so without configuration the app would throttle whole Cloudflare POPs
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rather than individual visitors.
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`deploy/Caddyfile` fixes this by:
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1. accepting only Cloudflare's published ranges, and
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2. setting `X-Forwarded-For` from Cloudflare's single-value `CF-Connecting-IP`
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header.
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That keeps `TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR=true` safe: direct clients cannot reach the app
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through Caddy, so they cannot forge the header.
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`deploy/Caddyfile` imports `cloudflare-ranges.caddy`. The file is generated by
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`deploy/update-cloudflare-ranges.sh`; do not edit it by hand.
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The script is run hourly by `chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.timer`. It:
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- downloads <https://www.cloudflare.com/ips-v4> and
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<https://www.cloudflare.com/ips-v6>,
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- rejects empty or malformed responses,
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- validates the candidate Caddyfile,
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- reloads Caddy only when the ranges changed.
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If the download, validation or Caddy reload fails, the previous ranges stay in
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place.
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Install and run it:
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```sh
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sudo install -m 0755 /opt/chesstrainer/src/deploy/update-cloudflare-ranges.sh \
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/usr/local/sbin/chesstrainer-update-cloudflare-ranges
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sudo install -m 0644 /opt/chesstrainer/src/deploy/cloudflare-ranges.caddy \
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/etc/caddy/cloudflare-ranges.caddy
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sudo install -m 0644 /opt/chesstrainer/src/deploy/chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.service \
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/etc/systemd/system/chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.service
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sudo install -m 0644 /opt/chesstrainer/src/deploy/chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.timer \
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/etc/systemd/system/chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.timer
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sudo systemctl daemon-reload
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sudo systemctl enable --now chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.timer
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sudo systemctl start chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.service
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```
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If `/opt/chesstrainer/src/deploy` is not present on the VPS, create the same
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four files directly with `sudo tee` from the canonical contents in `deploy/`.
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The timer only uses the installed copies.
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Check the timer and last run:
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```sh
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systemctl list-timers chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.timer
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systemctl status chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.service
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journalctl -u chesstrainer-cloudflare-ranges.service --since "24 hours ago"
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```
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Apply the site block by hand on the shared Caddy host, then validate and
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reload:
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```sh
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sudo caddy validate --config /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
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sudo systemctl reload caddy
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```
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Direct requests to the origin with a spoofed `CF-Connecting-IP` must receive
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`403 Access Denied`; only Cloudflare's ranges should reach the Phoenix app. A
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host firewall allowlist for Cloudflare on ports 80 and 443 is a useful
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defence-in-depth addition.
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## 3. Cloudflare edge rate limiting
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This is for connection and request floods, not credential guessing. The
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application already stops password attempts cheaply.
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The production rule is the free-plan version:
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| Setting | Value |
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|---|---|
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| Name | Login POST flood |
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| Expression | `(http.request.method eq "POST" and http.request.uri.path in {"/admin/log-in" "/users/log-in"})` |
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| Characteristic | IP |
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| Period | 10 seconds |
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| Requests | 10 |
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| Action | Block |
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| Duration | 10 seconds |
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Because the free plan only offers a 10-second period and a 10-second block, this
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is a burst limiter rather than a lasting ban. An attacker can retry after ten
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seconds, but the application still stops that login after five failures and that
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address after ten failures within fifteen minutes. A slow attacker staying under
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10 requests per 10 seconds never gets to make useful guesses because of the app
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throttle.
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Bot Fight Mode is off. On the free plan it cannot be skipped for CI or for the
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on-box health probe, so a datacenter `curl` gets a 403 while the site itself is
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healthy; #153 covers the gate and probe changes needed before it goes back on.
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If the plan later gains longer rate-limit windows or managed WAF rules, raise
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the block duration and consider a broader site-wide rule, such as 100 requests
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per 10 seconds per IP with a managed challenge. Use Under Attack Mode during an
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active incident.
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### Registration cannot be limited this way
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`/users/register` is a LiveView. The form submit is a LiveView event sent over
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the shared `/live/websocket` connection, not a `POST /users/register` request.
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Cloudflare therefore cannot count account creations with a rule on the
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registration path.
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A Cloudflare rule on `GET /users/register` only limits page opens; a bot can
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open one page and submit many registrations over the socket. If registration
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spam becomes a problem, add an application-level registration throttle keyed by
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`ChesstrainerWeb.ClientAddress.from_socket/1`, and/or add Cloudflare Turnstile
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to the form.
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While `PRELAUNCH=true`, registration is blocked entirely by the prelaunch plug
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and LiveView mount redirect.
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## 4. Why not fail2ban for HTTP?
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fail2ban needs the raw client address to build a firewall rule. The application
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deliberately logs only a boot-scoped HMAC, and this deployment sits behind
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Cloudflare. Banning the address that reaches the origin would ban Cloudflare
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edges, not attackers.
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fail2ban remains useful for services that terminate connections directly on the
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VPS, such as SSH. It is not part of the HTTP login defence.
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